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CASE NOTES
in effect, have to disprove an unestablished illegal purpose, rather than have
to .prove a legitimate objective.
The present case indicates that the Court will require the employer to
assert some business justifications. It does not establish a new and arduous
standard of substantiality. If substantial and legitimate ends denote some
asserted business justifications, then the employer must look to Erie Resistor,
Brown, and American Ship Bldg. for examples of such justifications. The
fact that "legitimate objectives" are part of the balance-of-interest process
should now illustrate to the employer his burden to produce some actual
counterweight for his own side of the scale. The lesson of Great Dane is that
an employer who offers no genuine countervailing interest to a section 8(a) (3)
charge of discriminatory conduct will automatically lose his case. It is now
apparently settled that the terms "business justifications" and "legitimate
objectives" require more positive interests than those alleged in Great Dane.
MITCHELL J. SIKORA
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Section 8 (b) (1) (A)—
Court-Enforced Fines Under a Union-Shop Provision.—NLRB v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. 1—Employees of Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company
represented by locals of the United Automobile Workers under a union-shop
provision2 voted to strike at two Wisconsin plants. Despite union picket
lines, several members of the union continued to work during the strike.
Upon conclusion of the dispute, the union found the strikebreaking members
guilty of "conduct unbecoming a union member" and fined them from $20
to $100. 3 When several refused to pay the fine, one of the locals successfully
enforced the fines by bringing a test suit for collection in a state court against
one of the strikebreakers who, prior to the strike, had fully- participated in
union affairs. 4 Allis-Chalmers then filed unfair-labor-practice charges with
the National Labor Relations Board. The company asserted the right of the
fined members to refrain from concerted union activity under Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act; the fines, the company argued, restrained
or coerced the workers in the exercise of that right and, therefore, violated
1 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
2 The collective-bargaining agreements contain a union-security provision which
requires employees to become and "`remain members of the Union to the extent of pay-
ing dues.'" Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656, 657 (7th Cir. 1966).
3 The UAW constitution requires members to "support strike action" taken in
accordance with the constitution (Art. 2, Sec. 3) and provides for sanctions for viola-
tions including reprimand, fines not to exceed one hundred dollars, and suspension or
expulsion from the International Union (Art. 30, See: 10). Brief for Appellant at 4-5,
388 U.S. 175 (1967).
4 Local 248, UAW v. Natzke, No. 313-673 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee County March 3,
1964), aff'd, 4 CCH Lab. L. Rep. If 12,251 (Wis. Sup. Ct. Oct. 31, 1967). In this test case
brought by the union, the court held that the defendant became a member of the union
for all purposes including attendance at union meetings, and had therefore assumed all
of the duties of membership. But see Glass Workers, Local 188 Y. Seitz, 65 Wash. 2d
640, 399 P.2d 74 (1965).
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Section 8(b) (1)(A) of the Act which forbids such restraint or coercion. 5
The Board dismissed the complaint on the ground that the fines were. a
matter of union internal affairs and were therefore protected by the proviso
to section 8(b) (1)(A) which preserves the union's right to regulate "the
acquisition or retention of membership" in the union without regard to the
prohibitions of the section.° A three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed. After a rehearing en bane, the Seventh Circuit held (4-3) that, under
a literal reading of section 8(b) (1) (A), fines against union members ex-
ercising their section 7 right to refrain from concerted activity restrained
or coerced them in the exercise of that right. In so doing, the court rejected
the Board's use of the proviso by narrowly reading it to immunize from the
prohibitions of section 8(b) (1)(A) only expulsion from the union as a per-
missible form of union discipline.? On certiorari the Supreme Court was
faced with the following questions: (I) Did the union fines, including the
one enforced in court, violate section 8(b) (1) (A) by restraining or coercing
employees in the exercise of their section 7 right to refrain from concerted
activities; and (2) if so, are such fines protected by the proviso. The Court
5 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1964).
Section 8 provides in relevant part: -
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall
not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein . .
Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a) (3) of
this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
6 Local 248, UAW, 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964).
The trial examiner recommended to the Board dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the case was governed by Local 283, UAW (Wisconsin Motor Corp.), 145
N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964). In that case a union fined members who had exceeded production
ceilings set by the union. The Board ruled that such a fine was protected by the proviso
to § 8(b) (1)(A) because it involved an area concerning the status of a union member
in his capacity as a member rather than as an employee. In the earlier case of Minne-
apolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954), the Board ruled that a union fine
upon a member for not attending meetings and performing picket duty during a strike
was not prohibited by § 8(b) (1) (A) because the proviso immunizes such internal affairs.
It has been argued that these cases are inconsistent with several others in which the
Board labeled union fines imposed for the failure of a member to exhaust internal union
remedies prior to filing charges with the Board as restraint or coercion within the
meaning of § 8(b)(1) (A). See Comment, 8(b)(1)(A) Limitations upon the Right of
a Union to Fine Its Members, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47, 74-83 (1966); H.B. Roberts, 148
N.L.R.B. 674 (1964), aff'd, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Local 138, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs (Charles S. Skura), 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964). These cases, however,
are clearly distinguishable as resting upon "the overriding public interest" in preserving
access to the Board's processes. See id. at 682.
7 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966).
222
CASE NOTES
answered the first question negatively, and thus, did not have to answer the
second. HELD: A court-enforced union fine for nonparticipation in a strike
is not an unfair labor practice within section 8(b) (1)(A) where the fined
employees enjoyed full union membership under a union-shop provision. 8
In a strong dissent, Mr. Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan
and Stewart, asserted that union fines did constitute restraint or coercion
and that in seeking to enforce the fines through court action the union had
stepped beyond the activities protected by the proviso.
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court rejected the literal reading
by the court of appeals of section 8(b)(1) (A) and particularly took issue
with its interpretation of the words "restrain or coerce" as unambiguously
covering union fines for strikebreaking. Relying on the legislative history of
the Taft-Hartley Act, the majority concluded that section 8(b) (1) (A) was
not intended by Congress to regulate internal union discipline and that in
prohibiting restraint or coercion the primary concern of Congress was strong-
arm organizational tactics, not fines of employees already within the union. 9
Thus the Court decided that a union fine for strikebreaking was not restraint
or coercion within the meaning of section 8(b) (1) (A).
Having concluded that a union fine for strikebreaking was not an un-
fair labor practice per se, the Court turned to the argument that the means
used to enforce the fine, specifically court enforcement, made the union ac-
tion illegal. Looking to the history of section 8(b) (1) (A), the Court noted
that the "contract theory" of union membership widely prevailed at the
time of passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. Under this theory, employees who
become members of a union bind themselves to a contract, consisting of the
union constitution and by-laws, which may be enforced in court. The Court
pointed out that there was not one word of legislative history showing any
concern with the permissible or impermissible means of enforcement of union
fines, although Congress, operating within the context of the contract theory,
must have been aware of the fact that a lawsuit for breach of contract was
available to unions as a means of enforcing union fines. The majority also
reasoned that to permit fines, but without court enforcement, would visit
upon the member of a strong union the potentially more severe punishment
of expulsion, "while impairing the bargaining facility of the weak union
by requiring it either to condone misconduct or deplete its ranks." 19 Turning
8 388 U.S. at 190-92, 196. Although the Supreme Court used the term "full member"
in the Allis-Chalmers case, it never fully defined the term. The term "full union member"
has been called an "undefined concept." Legal Memorandum prepared by John L. Wad-
dleton, Chief Counsel for Allis-Chalmers.
9 These conclusions are consistent with an earlier dedsion by the Court in which
Justice Brennan referred to the terms "restrain" and "coerce" in § 8(b) (1) (A) as
"nonspecific, indeed vague, words" and stated that "[t]he note repeatedly sounded
[in the legislative history] is as to the necessity for protecting individual workers from
union organizational tactics tinged with violence, duress or reprisal." NLRB v. Teamsters
Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 286, 290 (1960).
Although a substantial part of the majority and dissenting opinions dealt with the
legislative history of § 8(b)(1) (A), this note will not discuss the relative merit of the
conclusions reached by either side on this question.
lo 388 U.S. at 292.
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to the fact that all the fined employees were full members of the union, the
majority held that they were subject to union disciplinary measures, in-
cluding the court-enforced fine. In other words, by becoming fully partici-
pating members, they were deemed to have waivedn their section 7 right
to refrain from concerted activity to the extent that this right was modified
in the contract by provisions for majority rule. This conclusion clearly
strengthens majority rule within labor unions which, the Court emphasized,
is fundamental to our national labor policy.' 2
There was no disagreement on the Court as to the validity of union rules
against strikebreaking and the use of expulsion to enforce such rules." In-
deed, the proviso to section 8(6)(1) (A) clearly permits such action. 14 The
Court, however, did not use the proviso as did the Board to authorize the
action of the union in fining its members and enforcing these fines in court—
"Our conclusion that § 8(b) (1) (A) does not prohibit the locals' actions
makes it unnecessary to pass on the Board holding that the proviso protected
such actions.' 15 Thus, although the Court stated that "the proviso preserves
the rights of unions to impose fines, as a lesser penalty than expulsion ...
this statement was not an integral part of the Court's holding.
Writing for the dissent, Justice Black also delved into the legislative
history, but, unlike the majority, concluded that Congress intended section
8(b) (1) (A) to protect union as well as nonunion employees from coercive
union tactics. Consequently, he preferred a strictly literal reading of "restrain
or coerce" as used in section 8(b) (1) (A) so as to encompass union fines
against strikebreakers. It was, however, chiefly on the issue of the conse-
quences of court-enforced fines, as distinguished from fines enforced by the
11 In delineating the majority holding, Justice Black in the dissent stated "the Court
in characterizing the union-member relationship as 'contractual' and in emphasizing that
its holding is limited to situations where the employee is a 'full member' of the union,
implies that by joining a union an employee gives up or waives some of his § 7 rights."
388 U.S. at 200.
See 80 Harv. L. Rev. 683 (1967) for a discussion of "waiver" in Allis -Chalmers.
12 "'The majority-rule concept is today unquestionably at the center of our federal
labor policy.'" 388 U.S. at 180, quoting Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Repre-
sentation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1333 (1958).
In the well-known case of DeMille v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d
139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948), a union fine against Cecil B.
DeMille for refusing to pay one dollar for financing a union campaign in opposition to
a state right-to-work law was upheld. The court held that, as a member, DeMille was
bound by the will of the majority of the membership as lawfully expressed under the
union constitution and by-laws. DeMille had been forced to join the union by virtue of
a closed-shop provision, which was then legal.
13 "Thus, neither the majority nor the dissent in this case questions the validity of
the union rule against its members crossing picket lines during a properly called strike,
nor the propriety of expulsion to enforce the rule." 388 U.S. at 198 (White, J. concur-
ring).
14 The Seventh Circuit narrowly read the proviso to immunize from the prohibitions
of § 8(b) (1) (A) only expulsion from the union as a permissible form of union dis-
cipline. Even Allis-Chalmers conceded that under the Act, the union could expel the of-
fending members. See 358 F.2d at 667-68.
16 388 U.S. at 192, n.29.
16 Id. at 191-92.
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union itself, that the Court was divided. Justice Black stated, "Even on the
assumption that § 8(b) (1)(A) permits a union to fine a member as long
as the fine is only enforceable by expulsion, the fundamental error of the
Court's opinion is its failure to recognize the practical and theoretical dif-
ference between a court-enforced fine, as here, and a fine enforced by ex-
pulsion or less drastic intra-union means." 17 In pointing out this "practical
difference," Justice Black attacked the majority's statement that a fine is a
"lesser" penalty than expulsion. He asserted that if a weak union is involved
and union membership has little value the court enforcement of a fine may
be far more effective punishment than expulsion. The dissent concluded that
the Court's decision amounts to a policy judgment that weak unions need
the power of court enforcement of fines in order to effectively pursue their
roles as collective-bargaining representatives."
Justice Black also strongly disagreed with the majority's application of
the contract theory of union membership to the facts of this case. He stressed
that the contract theory is essentially a fiction—"Particularly is that so
where the 'contract' between the union and the employee is the involuntary
product of a union shop. . . . I doubt that even an ordinary commercial
contract is enforceable against a party who entered into it involuntarily." 1 "
In order to appreciate the force of this argument by the dissent, it is neces-
sary to understand the implications of a union-shop provision. The statutory
provision of the Taft-Hartley Act which authorizes the union shop limits
the compulsory obligations of a union member to the payments of dues and
initiation fees. 2° A union-shop agreement thus gives the employee the option
of either becoming a "full member,"2 ' one who participates in union affairs
beyond mere dues paying such as by voting in union elections, or of becoming
what might be called a "nominal member," one who does no more than pay
his required dues and initiation fees. The majority in Allis-Chalmers recog-
nized the existence of such an option by refusing to rule whether fines could
be imposed on members whose membership is in fact limited to paying
dues.22 Although this refusal to rule on the matter suggests that an employee
might be able to escape judicial enforcement of the fine by showing that he
was not a "full member" of the union, Justice Black replied that "few em-
ployees would have the courage or the financial means to be willing to take
that risk."23 Thus a basic objection of the dissent to the holding of the
17 Id. at 203-04.
18 Id. at 201.
13 Id. at 207-08.
20 Section 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964).
Section 8(b) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to attempt to cause
an employer to discharge an employee whose membership in the union was denied or
terminated "on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership."
29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(2) (1964).
21 See note 8 supra.
22 "Whether those prohibitions [of the Taft-Hartley Act on the use of fines] would
apply if the locals had imposed fines on members whose membership was in fact limited
to the obligation of paying monthly dues is a question not before us and upon which we
intimate no view." 388 U.S. at 197.
23 Id. at 204.
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Court was that according to the decision an employee in a union shop is
forced to join a union or to enter a "contract," at least to the extent of paying
dues and initiation fees; and the contract theory is then invoked to justify
court enforcement of union fines when the employee attempts to exercise his
section 7 right to refrain from engaging in concerted activities. In other
words, the full member, who might have been unaware of the fact that in
a union shop he could limit his membership to dues-paying, no longer has the
right to refrain from taking part in a strike.
Consideration of the contract theory is fundamental to any analysis
involving the issue of court-enforced fines in Allis-Chalmers. According to the
theory, membership in a labor union constitutes a contract between the mem-
ber and the union, the terms of which are governed by the constitution and
by-laws of the union. In consideration for his agreement to be bound by
union rules the full member receives the benefits of the organization such
as insurance, welfare benefits, use of union grievance procedures and par-
ticipation in its democratic processes. 24 The characterization of union mem-
bership as a contract has been widely accepted in this country. 25 It is,
however, well-recognized that the contract theory is essentially a fiction. The
union constitution and by-laws are not really a negotiated contract; the
constitution is often vague and one who accepts employment by joining a
union has no choice but to abide by the terms existing when he joins."
Courts, nevertheless, will provide a remedy for breach of such contract by
either member or union. 27 In this way the contract theory provides the courts
a necessary means of both protecting individuals from abuse of union power
and of enforcing the rules of the union so as to maintain a viable system of
majority rule. In recognizing that the theory is a fiction, however, courts
have freely interpreted the terms of the contract in order to reach the most
equitable result. 2s Thus, courts have treated such typically vague language
as "conduct unbecoming a union member," as in Allis-Chalmers, as little
more than a mere framework from which the merits of a case are deter-
mined."
24 Now under Allis -Chalmers, once the employee fully joins a union he relinquishes
his rights under § 7 to the extent that he submits to the enforceable rules of the union.
See id. at 197. See also NLRB v. International Union, UAW, 320 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.
1963).
25 "This contractual conception of the relation between a member and his union
widely prevails in this country . . . ." International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,
356 U.S. 617, 618 (1958) (Frankfurter, j.) .
28 See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049,
1054-56 (1951); Wellington, supra note 12, at 1346. See Chafee, The Internal Affairs of
Associations not for Profit, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993 (1930) for a particularly critical view
of the contract theory.
27 See, e.g., Sanders v. International Bridge Workers, 235 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1956);
UAW Local 756 v. Woychik, 5 Wis. 2d 528,.93 N.W.2d 336 (1958). In Allis - Chalmers the
union warned the fined members of the possibility of court enforcement of the fines by
informing them of the Woychik case in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court held such
fines enforceable. 388 US. at 177-78, n.2. See Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1004 (1967).
28 See Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70
Yale L.J. 175, 180-184, 222 (1960).
25 388 U.S. at 177. Courts often apply a restrictive interpretation to a harshly used
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A basic assumption of the contract theory, that an employee joins a
union and thereby willingly binds himself to a "contract," breaks down when
membership is not voluntary. In short, a union should not be able to enforce
in court a fine against one who has not voluntarily bound himself to the consti-
tution and by-laws of the union.30 It thus follows that when a union-shop
situation exists a major objection to using the contract theory to impose
court-enforced fines is that the employee was forced to enter a "contractual
relationship" with the union as a condition of employment.
This objection is especially strong where a "nominal member" is deemed
to have entered a contractual relationship with a union he is forced to
join. A nominal member of a union should not be subject to court-enforced
fines since he has not voluntarily entered a contract with the union; he is
a "member" in name only. In the controversial case of Union Starch & Ref.
Co. v. NLRB, 31 the Seventh Circuit held that an employee's refusal in a
union shop to conform to union regulations, in this case a refusal to take
an oath of allegiance to the union constitution, may not result in the em-
ployee's discharge from employment except where he has failed to tender
periodic dues and fees. 32 It has been argued that under the rule in this case
employees are not compelled to "join" a union but merely to pay dues; 3"
others have disagreed arguing that under Union Starch "membership" is
still required in a union shop. 34 The controversy is merely a semantic one
over the word "membership." Under the Union Starch interpretation of the
Taft-Hartley Act, employees in a union shop are compelled only to become
nominal members of the union. Recent cases clarify the situation by sug-
gesting that there is little more than a semantic difference between the
agency shop, in which all employees must pay dues to the union and in
which "membership" is a voluntary additional step, and the union shop,
in which all employees must pay dues and are called "members" even if only
dues payers. In upholding the legality of the agency shop under the Taft-
Hartley Act the Supreme Court stated:
Of course, if the union chooses to extend membership even though
the employee will meet only the minimum financial burden, and
refuses to support or "join" the union in any other affirmative way,
the employee may have to become a "member" under a union shop
disciplinary provision to find that a union member's conduct did not come within the
meaning of the clause under which he was prosecuted. See, e.g., Madden v. Atkins, 4
N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958) (expulsion for "dual unionism" in
criticizing incumbent officers during an election was held to be against public policy); Leo
v. Local 612, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 26 Wash. 2d 498, 174 P.2d 523 (1946)
("causing dissension" did not include soliciting members for a rival union).
30 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
31 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
32 See NLRB v. Leece-Neville Co., 330 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1964) ; NLRB v. Biscuit &
Cracker Workers Local 405, 222 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1955).
33 Summers, Freedom of Association and Compulsory Unionism in Sweden and
the United States, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 647, 686 (1964) ; Toner, The Taft-Hartley Union
Shop Does Not Force Anyone to Join a Union, 6 Lab. L.J. 690 (1955).
34 Cogen, Is Joining the Union Required in the Taft-Hartley Union Shop? 5 Lab.
L.J. 659 (1954); 52 Mich. L. Rev. 619 (1954).
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contract, in the sense that the union may be able to place him on
its rolls. The agency shop arrangement proposed here removes that
choice from the union and places the option of membership in the
employee while still requiring the same monetary support as does
the union shop. Such a difference between the union and agency
shop may be of great importance in some contexts, but for the pres-
ent purposes it is more formal than real . 35
As to the issue of court-enforced fines the difference between the union and
agency shop is also "more formal than real." Although the agency shop
makes "membership" voluntary while the union shop requires it, compulsory
nominal membership in the latter is no different from nonmembership in
the former."
The unreal nature of the differences between the union and agency shop
becomes even more clear in Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n Local 1625 v. Scherm-
erhonr37 in which the Supreme Court held that the agency shop is within
Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act which allows state "right-to-work"
laws to prohibit "agreements requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment . . . ." 38 (Emphasis added.) Since under the
Taft-Hartley Act the union-shop clause is merely a provision for requiring
compulsory dues, there is no more reason for permitting court-enforced fines
against a nominal member in a union shop than there would be for enforcing
such fines against a nonmember who pays dues in an agency shop. In neither
case does the employee enter a contract with the union to the extent of doing
more than he is legally required to do.
Although Taft-Hartley does allow the employee a choice between full
membership and mere dues-paying, full membership is in reality compul-
sory for most employees, since they do not realize that they have such a
choice. As a practical matter an employee's signature to a membership card
and application is merely a matter of routine. Only the most knowledgeable
and contentious employee would retain a lawyer to advise him of the rami-
fications of full union membership. 3° In discussing the compulsory nature
of union membership under a union-security provision, Justice Black effec-
tively argued that if the union uses the union shop to compel employees to
38 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1963). The Court con-
tinued, "To the extent that [the difference] has any significance at all it serves, rather
than violates, the desire of Congress to reduce the evils of compulsory unionism while
allowing financial support for the bargaining agent." Id. at 744.
38 It has been argued that the agency and union shops are the same. Rose, The
Agency Shop v. the Right-to-Work Law, 9 Lab L J 579 (1958). But see Jones, The
Agency Shop, 10 Lab. L.J. 781 (1959). In contending that the agency shop is different
from the union shop, Jones incorrectly anticipates that state right-to-work laws which
prohibit union shops cannot prohibit agency shops. Id. at 788. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n
Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963), aff'd on rehearing, 375 U.S. 96 (1963)
proved this statement to be incorrect.
37 373 U.S. 746, aff'd on rehearing, 375 U.S. 96 (1963); see 5 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.
Rev. 440 (1964).
38 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1964).
33 See Brief for New York Times Display Advertising Salesmen Steering Com-
mittee as Amicus Curiae at 14, 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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pay dues, calls these employees members, and then uses their membership
to impose court-enforced fines upon those employees unwilling to join a
union strike, it is using the union shop to coerce employees to join in
concerted activity, a purpose other than to compel payment of dues and
fees." This result is clearly contrary to an earlier case in which the Supreme
Court stated, "[t]his legislative history clearly indicates that Congress in-
tended to prevent utilization of union security agreements for any purpose
other than to compel payment of union dues and fees." 41 Justice Black
rejected the majority argument that the employees involved waived their
section 7 right to refrain from concerted activity by accepting full member-
ship:
Few employees forced to become "members" of the union by virtue
of the union security clause will be aware of the fact that they must
somehow "limit" their membership to avoid the union's court-
enforced fines. . . . [I]t is clear that what restrains the employee
from going to work during a union strike is the union's threat
that it will fine him and collect those fines from him in court. . . .
By refusing to decide whether § 8(b) (1 ) (A) prohibits the union
from fining an employee who does nothing more than pay union
dues as a condition to retaining his job in a union shop, the Court
adds coercive impetus to the union's threat of fines. Today's de-
cision makes it highly dangerous for an employee in a union shop
to exercise his § 7 right to refrain from participating in a strike
called by a union in which he is a member by name only. 42
As Justice Black indicated, the decision of the Court goes too far and
leaves too many questions unanswered. Since the majority did not consider
what motivated an employee's full membership to be relevant," any full mem-
ber of a union is now subject to court-enforced union fines for strikebreaking.
Employees who merely pay union dues are left uncertain as to whether they
are subject to fines particularly those that may be enforced in court." It
40 388 U.S. at 215.
41 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954). The Court continued:
Thus Congress recognized the validity of the unions' concern about "free-riders,"
i.e., employees who receive the benefits of union representation but are unwilling
to contribute their share of financial support to such union, and gave unions the
power to contract to meet that problem while withholding from unions the
power to cause the discharge of employees for any other reason.
Id.
42 388 U.S. at 215-16.
43 "But the relevant inquiry here is not what motivated a member's full member-
ship but whether the Taft-Hartley amendments prohibited disciplinary measures against
a full member who crossed his union's picket line." Id. at 196.
In his opinion, dissenting from the decision of the Seventh Circuit, Chief Justice
Hastings maintained that full membership was voluntary and not compulsory in Allis-
Chalmers; thus, the full members, he reasoned, were bound to union rules against strike-
breaking. 358 F.2d at 662.
44 It follows logically from the Court's opinion that union fines without court
enforcement would be permissible even against nominal members. The proviso to § 8
(b) (1)(A) clearly allows expulsion from the union of such members, and therefore
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will require future litigation to determine whether a nominal member of
a union is subject to court-enforced fines.
It is submitted that the Court might better have safeguarded individual
rights while still sustaining the validity of union fines for strikebreaking by
ruling that a court-enforced fine for strikebreaking is an unfair labor practice
only where the fined employee is a nominal member or where the employee
joins the union as a full member without full knowledge that under a union-
shop agreement he could have abstained from full membership by paying
his dues and initiation fees while participating in no other union activity. To
collect a fine in court, the burden would be on the union to prove that the
full member knew or should have known of the choice between full and
nominal membership available to him. Had the Court ruled in this way, the
legitimacy of court-enforced fines under the contract theory would logically
follow since courts would then be enforcing fines only against those em-
ployees who voluntarily bind themselves to union provisions for majority
rule. The unions' power to promote solidarity and discipline within their
ranks would be maintained without sacrificing the section 7 rights of the
individual to refrain from the activities of the group. Since the collective-
bargaining agreements in Allis -Chalmers contained informative union-shop
provisions which required that employees join the union within thirty days
after hiring and remain members to the extent of paying dues, 45
 a court
enforcing a union fine could find that these clauses alone, if clearly printed
on a form signed by the employee, are sufficient to carry the union's burden
of proof that the employee knew or should have known of his choice between
full and nominal membership.
Under such a ruling, mere dues-paying nonmembers in an agency shop
would not be subject to court-enforced fines; it is uncertain whether they
now are subject to such fines. Judicial enforcement of fines, however, in all
open-shop situations would be permissible since union membership in an
open shop is voluntary." Under union-shop provisions all those who ac-
cepted full membership voluntarily 47 would also be subject to court-enforced
fines since they voluntarily entered a contract with the union and under its
constitution and by-laws agreed to submit to majority rule. 48 Only those
who chose to pay dues without accepting full membership and those whom
the union failed to inform of their membership alternatives would not be
subject to court-enforced fines. Some full members who were fined might tem-
porarily benefit from the uncertain interim situation by claiming that they did
should also protect mere fines which the Court reasoned were a "lesser penalty" than
expulsion. This is especially so if the only way to punish nonpayment is expulsion as the
ultimate sanction.
45 See note 2 supra.
46 An analysis by the Department of Labor of 1631 major collective bargaining
contracts in effect for the years 1958-59 and covering a total of 7.5 million workers
showed that 81% of those contracts contained union security arrangements. A prior study
showed union shops alone to be 74% of the total. McDermott, Union Security and Right-
to-Work Laws, 16 Lab. L.J. 667, 672 (1965).
47 I.e., those who knew or should have known that they were free to limit member-
ship to dues paying.
48 See note 12 supra.
230
CASE NOTES
not know of any membership choice when they joined the union. Since it is
likely, however, that litigation would eventually establish minimum stan-
dards for unions to meet in carrying the burden of proving that members
knew or should have known of their membership choice, the group not sub-
ject to court-enforced fines because they were ill-informed would eventually
disappear while all union members would be informed of their legal rights
under a union-shop provision. It is also likely that the threat of social
ostracism and the potential advantages of participation in union programs,
including voting on union policy, would keep those who chose to pay only
dues at a minimum. These nominal members would not be "free riders" nor
would they be restrained or coerced into joining the concerted activities
of the group in whose internal affairs they wished to take no part. 49
ROBERT S. BLOOM
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Section 301(a)—State
Court Injunction Against Strike—Removal to Federal Court.—Avco
Corp. v. Machinists Aero Lodge 735. 1—Plaintiff corporation, which is
engaged in interstate commerce, had entered into a collective-bargaining
agreement with defendant union. The agreement included both a no-strike
clause and a binding-arbitration clause. Following a series of work stoppages
which culminated in a plantwide strike, the corporation brought suit against
the union in a state court, requesting both an injunction against the strike
and "general relief." When the state court issued a temporary restraining
order against violation of the no-strike clause, the union, pursuant to Section
1441(b) of the Removal Act,2 removed the action to the federal district
court, and there moved: (1) to dissolve the temporary injunction; and (2)
to dismiss the action on the ground that the district court has no power to
issue or maintain the injunction by reason of the restrictions of Section 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Acts The corporation moved to remand the action
43 In the union answer to the rehearing petition of Allis-Chalmers at the court of
appeals level, the union conceded that if the fined members had no obligation to the
union beyond paying dues and fees they would not be subject to the union "'require-
ment of obedience to the common cause.'" 358 F.2d at 669.
1 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 88 S. Ct. 103 (1967) (No. 445).
2 28 U.S.C. 1441(b) (1965).
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or resi-
dence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of
the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of
the State in which such action is brought.
3 29 U.S.C. 104 (1965).
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
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